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A turn to the affects has been well underway in the critical humanities over 
the last two decades. Work on ‘affective labour’ or even the ‘affects of 
capitalism’ is now ubiquitous,1 as the feelings and expressions of 
individuals in late capitalism have become politicised, undermining a 
veneer of common participation and consent in the operations of capital. 
Concepts like ‘capitalist realism’ (Mark Fisher), ‘cruel optimism’ (Lauren 
Berlant) or ‘emotional labour’ (Arlie Russell Hochschild) have refocused 
political attention to the inner states of subjectivity, self-expression and 
relationality.2 Amid rising right-wing populist electoral breakthroughs 
globally, William Davies is among many in his recent argument that 
 
1 E.g. Bruno Latour, ‘On Some of the Affects of Capitalism’. Lecture Given at the 
Royal Academy, Copenhagen, 26th February 2014. http://www.bruno-
latour.fr/sites/default/files/136-AFFECTS-OF-K-COPENHAGUE.pdf [URL accessed 
30.10.18] 
2 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism (Winchester: Zero, 2009); Lauren Berlant, Cruel 
Optimism (Durham; London: Duke University Press, 2011); Arlie Russell Hochschild, 
The Managed Heart (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 
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‘feelings have taken over the world’, particularly pain, fear and anger. They 
have become gravitational centres for new political formations, often at the 
expense of existing centrist parties, in which the individual can ‘become 
(and feel) part of something much larger than themselves’.3 While 
undoubtedly not new phenomena, the political significance of emotion and 
feeling in new democratic movements has been heightened in a reportedly 
‘post-truth’ era. 
Affect is more than mere emotion, and readings in affect theory (an 
admittedly broad and not-all-ecumenical church) define this slippery 
subject as that which exceeds representation, conscious intentionality, or 
the sign. Affect instead is that which is embodied, and through being 
embodied, points to our fundamental situatedness or ‘in-between-ness’ in 
an interrelational, often interdependent world of forces and bodily 
encounters.4 That said, work of the affective turn has often rested upon 
some questionable theoretical assumptions. There has been a tendency to 
identify and endorse a liberatory potential in a given affect itself – be it 
‘radical happiness’ (Lynne Segal), political ‘love’ (Martha Nussbaum), or 
communist ‘desire’ (Jodi Dean) – as if these affective states were somehow 
inherently or universally empowering for more than a small number of like-
minded people.5 Love, desire or joy does not always have a normatively 
beneficent character. It also presupposes a pre-individuated affective state 
that exists prior to or separate from mental representation – a criticism one 
can make of Brian Massumi’s claim that affect is ‘autonomous’ from 
linguistic signification in his influential essay, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’ 
 
3 William Davies, Nervous States (London: Jonathan Cape, 2018), p. 7. 
4 For a good introduction to the field, see Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Greig, 
‘An Inventory of Shimmers’, in their co-edited The Affect Theory Reader (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 1-9. 
5 Lynne Segal, Radical Happiness: Moments of Collective Joy (London: Verso, 
2017); Martha Nussbaum, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Jodi Dean, The Communist Horizon (Lon-
don: Verso, 2012), ch. 5.  
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(1995).6 What is an affect if not a certain idea of a bodily state? To propose 
that affects exist separately to mental or symbolic representations assumes 
an epistemology that rests on something akin to depth psychology that 
itself requires further explanation. Likewise, in political theory the affect 
of indignation has been heralded, not without justification, as the central 
affect of political resistance and protest, a move reflected in the new protest 
movements after 2010 like the Indignados in Spain and Aganaktismenoi 
(‘Outraged’) in Greece.7 While work has rightly explored the collectivising 
ethos of such common affects, it remains unclear how different orders of 
indignation, joy, desire, or love might be understood through their effects 
on the mobilisation of social and political movements. In other words, what 
distinguishes the indignation or joy of a reactionary or fascist grouping 
from a socially progressive or revolutionary one? 
The language of affects can be traced through a direct lineage to the 
philosopher Benedictus de Spinoza, who considered these elementary 
states to be not merely the external expressions of inner feelings, as 
emotions might be defined today, but as manifestations of an individual’s 
power. This reception of affects in Spinoza has occurred indirectly, 
particularly through Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s A Thousand 
Plateaus (1980) and its English translation by Massumi (1987), whose 
subsequent work develops the broad applicability of the affects in critical 
thought.8 For Spinoza, joyous affects correspond to an increase in the 
body’s power of acting, and sad affects to a diminution in this power, 
providing a materialist basis for understanding affects in terms of power 
 
6 Brian Massumi, ‘The Autonomy of Affect’, Cultural Critique, 31 (1995), p. 96. For 
a critique of his distinction between mind and body, see Ruth Leys, ‘The Turn to Af-
fect: A Critique’, Critical Inquiry, 37.3 (2011), pp. 434-437, 449-452. 
7 Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen, ‘Political Theory in the Square: Protest, 
Representation and Subjectification’, Contemporary Political Theory, 12.3 (2013), 
pp. 166-184. 
8 ‘Autonomy of Affect’, pp. 83-110; Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sen-
sation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002). 
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and activity.9  
We can map out an attempt to theorise a pre-Hegelian, non-dialectical 
collective subject of resistance and revolution in Deleuze’s earlier, incisive 
studies on Spinoza, Antonio Negri’s Savage Anomaly and Mark Fisher’s 
later attempts to derive a Spinozan politics for the contemporary era.10 
While this work has had an almost exclusive focus on the Ethics, Spinoza’s 
political writings, and in particular his final, underassessed Political 
Treatise, also treat the political affects as the elementary problem of 
politics. They provide a theoretical outline of how political movements can 
mobilise around a given affect, while simultaneously evincing a disdain, if 
not outright ‘fear’,11 of the social instability such movements might also 
cause. This marks a tension in Spinoza’s work, where sedition and 
rebellion are presented as problems for the state’s security while political 
transformation and revolution are presented as necessities. 
This article commences from this tension, proceeding to evaluate and 
resituate an understanding of political affects within the context of these 
debates. Just as Spinoza famously remarked that ‘no one has yet 
 
9 E3p11s. Spinoza referencing used: E = Ethics; TTP = Theological-Political Treatise 
(Tractatus Theologico-Politicus); TP = Political Treatise (Tractatus Politicus). Refer-
ences to TTP and TP indicate chapter number followed by section. References to Eth-
ics follow standard format: ad = definition of the affects, end of Part 3; app = appen-
dix; c = corollary; p = proposition; pref = preface; s = scholium. E.g. E4p37s2 refers 
to Ethics Part 4, proposition 37, second scholium. Editions used: Spinoza, The Col-
lected Works of Spinoza. Volumes I-II, trans. and ed. by Edwin Curley (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985, 2016). 
10 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, trans. by Martin Joughin (New 
York: Zone, 1990 [1968]); Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. by Robert Hurley 
(San Francisco: City Lights, 1988 [1970]); Antonio Negri, Savage Anomaly, trans. by 
Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003 [1981]); Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press: MIT, 2000); Mark 
Fisher, Capitalist Realism, ch. 9. 
11 Étienne Balibar describes a double-edged ‘fear of the masses’ in an eponymous es-
say in Masses, Classes and Ideas, trans. by James Swenson (London: Routledge, 
1994), p. 27. 
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determined what a body can do’,12 so this paper asks whether we have yet 
determined what an affect can do – politically, at least. With an eye on 
recent populist and anti-capitalist protests, this paper rereads Spinoza on 
the political affects to argue that resistance should shift from an affect of 
indignation to one of emulation. Such a shift involves cultivating forms of 
collective life that foster what Mark Fisher called ‘fellowship’,13 ‘positive 
depersonalisation’ and ‘consciousness raising’.14 This work can result in a 
collective joy, but is by no means simple, given the inherent and lasting 
challenges of power dynamics along lines of gender, race or class facing 
leftist and progressive organisations. Its structure is as follows: Part 1 
evaluates indignation, the primary affect of resistance; Part 2 critiques a 
view of revolution as transcendental; Part 3 proposes an argument for 
collective power using the imitative affect of emulation; and Part 4 uses 
Fisher’s concept of ‘positive depersonalisation’ to consider an alternative 
trajectory out of political quietism and ‘Left melancholia’, towards an 
ethics of desire that can fulfil the needs of individual and collective 
freedom. 
 
1. Indignation 
How should the citizens of a state respond to a sovereign whose rule 
threatens their own lives and the common good of the state? While Spinoza 
often quoted Seneca that ‘no-one has maintained a violent regime for long’, 
in the TTP he repeatedly warns against would-be ‘agitators and rebels’ 
disobeying existing laws or defying the instructions of the sovereign, 
insisting that it ‘very rarely happens’ that sovereigns make absurd 
commands.15 In the Ethics, that which brings ‘discord to the state’ is 
 
12 E3p2s. 
13 Mark Fisher, ‘Acid Communism’, in k-punk: The Collected and Unpublished Writ-
ings of Mark Fisher, ed. Darren Ambrose (London: Repeater, 2018), p. 763. 
14 Mark Fisher, ‘Abandon hope (summer is coming)’, k-punk, 11th May 2015. http://k-
punk.org/abandon-hope-summer-is-coming [URL accessed 30.10.18] 
15 TTP 20.7; 16.9; cf. TTP 17 passim on ‘sedition’. 
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considered evil, and the free individual, guided by reason, desires to adhere 
to and ‘keep the common laws of the state’.16 The TP asserts similarly that 
‘the more a man is led by reason … the more steadfastly he will observe 
the laws of the commonwealth and carry out the commands of the supreme 
power to whom he is subject’.17 Spinoza was writing in a context in which 
the insurrectionaries were pro-Orangist Calvinists opposed to the relative 
liberal pluralism of the Dutch Republic. Yet his repeated appeals to 
‘prudence’ in politics indicate the double-edged nature of political protest, 
resistance and revolt. ‘[H]ow imprudent many people are to try to remove 
a tyrant from their midst’, he writes in the TP, ‘when they can’t remove the 
causes of the prince’s being a tyrant’.18 This expands on an underdeveloped 
observation in the TTP on the ‘imprudence’ of parliamentarians during the 
English Civil War: they failed because they did not ‘change their form of 
state’, and so exchanged King Charles for King Oliver.19 Unless the 
institutional and cultural forms that produce monarchy and monarchical 
obedience are fundamentally transformed, they will continue to perpetuate 
themselves. Hannah Arendt concisely articulates the stakes of this problem: 
‘revolutions are more than successful insurrections’.20 Already then, our 
discussion faces two problems: the possibility and difficulty of changing 
the political sovereign or form of the state, and the life-in-common of 
political affects. To address these, let’s turn to a small number of Marxist 
readings that have politicised indignation in Spinoza to explore the 
conditions for successful revolutions.  
When ‘disagreements and rebellions are stirred up in a 
commonwealth’, writes Spinoza in the TP, the ‘result is never that the 
citizens dissolve the commonwealth’, but instead ‘they change its form to 
another’.21 Highlighting this passage, Filippo Del Lucchese notes that for 
 
16 E4p40; E4p73. 
17 TP 3.6. 
18 TP 5.7. 
19 TTP 18.8. 
20 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 1965), p. 24. 
21 TP 6.2. 
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Spinoza the state is the natural association that all human beings gravitate 
towards for the purpose of self-preservation, whether driven by reason or 
passive affects.22 By implication then, discord and sedition are the means 
by which a state’s form is changed. Whereas conflict in a state was 
imprudent and to be avoided at all costs in the TTP, it now becomes ‘an 
ineradicable element of its physiology’.23 Finding itself subject to forces of 
authoritarian control that seek to diminish and divide its collective strength, 
the multitude experiences ‘the affect of indignatio’ as a ‘drive and capacity 
for resistance’.24 Political repression thereby becomes constitutive of the 
‘life in common’, the first shared affect of the multitude. 
Warren Montag also observes the significance of indignation for a 
revolutionary politics in Spinoza. In a discussion of another part of the TP, 
he also asserts that ‘a state does not have the right to do that which will 
bring about the indignation of the majority’, as otherwise it will collapse.25 
Yet both commentators leave these observations tantalisingly 
underdeveloped, and allude only in passing to the work of Alexandre 
Matheron,26 where this politicised indignation finds its fullest expression. 
Indignation is an affect that begins in the imagination, being ‘hatred 
towards him who has done evil to another’,27 and related to pity, both 
requiring a judgement that the subjected party is ‘like us’, of a common 
nature. Matheron then departs from Spinoza’s own argumentation by 
asserting that it is also an imitative affect, that is, one whose joy or sadness 
 
22 Filippo Del Lucchese, Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza. 
Tumult and Indignation. (London: Continuum, 2009), pp. 78-79. 
23 Ibid., p. 78. 
24 Ibid., p. 60. Affects of resistance are those that determine the subject to a position of 
political resistance. 
25 Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and his Contemporaries (Lon-
don: Verso, 1999), p. 66, discussing TP 3.9. 
26 Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Paris: Minuit, 1988), 
pp. 416-7; ‘L’indignation et Ie conatus de l’Etat spinoziste’, in M. Revault D’Allones, 
H. Rizk (eds.), Spinoza: Puissance et ontologie (Paris: Kime, 1994), pp. 153-165. 
27 E3p22s. 
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is increased when we see another we judge of a common nature being 
affected by joy or sadness.28 For Matheron, when we imagine someone 
affecting a beloved object with sadness, ‘we shall be affected with hate 
towards him’.29 He then applies this to an individual living under a tyrant. 
The tyrant will necessarily be hated because they rule by fear, which causes 
sadness, and as ‘hatred is nothing but sadness accompanied by its external 
cause’, the subject’s fear leads to hatred, outrage, and collective 
indignation on the streets. 
There are two textual problems facing this argument that will be 
returned to in Part 3.30 What Matheron develops with the argument is most 
interesting. Why do subjects not work together to attack and overthrow the 
hated tyrant, given the fear it produces in them? ‘[I]f the subjects abstain, 
it is only to the extent that one or several amongst them, because they feel 
isolated, has no hope of achieving it’.31 If a tyranny can prevent individuals 
from recognising their common nature and grievances, disaggregating their 
collective power into isolated individual units, then it can reduce instances 
of collective rebellion. However, when the tyrant steals, kills and destroys 
on a large scale,32 many become disempowered and filled with hatred and 
soon cannot help but recognise each other’s suffering. By affective 
imitation, their indignation and hatred are collectively multiplied, and 
‘each perceives their hatred is universally shared’. In a process akin to the 
‘social contract’, they all ‘naturally coalesce’ and with ‘a union made of 
force’, their indignation becomes a collective power, and insurrection now 
has ‘the greatest chance of success’. The tyrant can then either grant 
concessions that persuade the indignant subjects to reinvest their right in 
its authority, or continue its violence against the subjects, with the 
 
28 Matheron, Individu, p. 156; cf. E3p27-p28, 3p34, 3p40, 3ad30, 4app14. 
29 Ibid.; E3p27c1. 
30 These concern fear and the intrinsic weakness of sad passive affects. Nor is 
indignation an imitative affect in Spinoza’s analysis, contra Matheron. 
31 Matheron, Individu, p. 416. 
32 E.g. Nero’s Rome, TP 4.4. 
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subsequent collapse of the state into war.33 
Indignation therefore becomes the first common political affect, one 
in which the abused multitude share in each other’s hatred and attempt to 
revenge themselves on their oppressor. For Matheron, it also has a 
regulative social function wherein the multitude’s ‘collective conatus’ is 
realised through an affect that attempts to purge the state of a defective 
authority.34 Laurent Bove also uses this collective conatus concept to 
describe the multitude and resistance.35 He deepens Matheron’s account of 
indignation by conceiving of it as one of two ‘affects of resistance’, that 
alongside benevolence, ‘the desire to benefit one whom we pity’,36 
constitute the two affective keys of political life. Natural oscillations 
between oppression and resistance function to ensure a dynamic 
equilibrium in social life and are the very process of its ‘self-
management’,37 with resistance to the civil power being an essential 
property of the citizen. This account of indignation still tends to regard 
politics in a way that is too sub specie aeternitatis however. What is to 
ensure an indignant multitude succeed in effectively transforming the state 
altogether so that one tyrant isn’t merely replaced with another, or that 
collective indignation coheres around socially progressive and rational 
objectives (i.e. democratic, egalitarian) over reactive and xenophobic 
ones? 
For Matheron, there is a ‘democratic conatus’ that the multitude share 
in through their interdependent relations, a dynamic and continually 
renewed consensus wherein all naturally seek their empowerment through 
 
33 Matheron, Individu, pp. 416-417. 
34 Matheron, ‘L’indignation et Ie conatus de l’Etat spinoziste’, pp. 161-164;  
35 Laurent Bove, La stratégie du conatus: affirmation et résistance chez Spinoza (Pa-
ris: Vrin, 1996), p. 257. 
36 Ibid., pp. 291-5; cf. E3ad35. 
37 Ibid., p. 301. 
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the state,38 whatever form its placeholder takes. But without sufficient 
capability, this multitude could just as easily fight for the authorities which 
subjugate it. The liberation Matheron envisions this elusive democratic 
conatus resulting in takes place only at the rarefied level of the mind(s). At 
the end of Individu et communauté he outlines a remarkable vision of a 
‘communism of minds’.39 Alongside pursuing generosity, prudence, 
gratitude, and obedience to the civil laws – the ‘mundane’ but socially 
necessary activities that reproduce the bourgeois liberal state – the 
philosopher actively works to ‘enable all of Humanity to exist as a totality 
conscious of itself, a microcosm of the infinite Understanding, in the heart 
of which every soul, although remaining itself, would at the same time 
become all the others’. This communism of minds seeks to raise the entire 
human race to the level of collective self-awareness, with neither ‘juridical 
laws nor institutional constraints’,40 thereby seeing the total withering 
away of the state and a full ‘communism of goods’. Knowledge of the third 
kind is collective, he indicates, because of its eternity and universality. Our 
collective awareness multiplies our knowledge of ourselves as individuals, 
and as interdependent members of a collective. In the process it surpasses 
‘all alienations and divergences’ on an affective level, as individuals come 
to recognise each other adequately as things of an ‘interhuman’ and 
common nature.41  
Matheron concludes that it also indicates the most complete liberation 
of the human mind alluded to by Spinoza, one that necessarily takes place 
on the collective level, ‘a complete and definitive individual liberation in a 
community without restriction’. In a shared collective consciousness, a 
communism of minds, the individual overcomes the ‘ultimate servitude’, 
death. Matheron concedes that the communism of minds exists as an ideal 
 
38 Alexandre Matheron, ‘The Theoretical Function of Democracy in Spinoza and 
Hobbes’, trans. by Ted Stolze, in The New Spinoza, ed. by Montag and Stolze (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 217. 
39 Matheron, Individu, p. 612. 
40 Ibid., p. 612, n95. 
41 Ibid., p. 613. 
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which humanity works towards without achieving, akin to the exemplar of 
the ‘free man’ in the Ethics Part 4. It functions ‘as a regulative Idea in the 
Kantian sense’,42 in that like Kant’s God, immortality and free will in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, the communism of minds does not constitute 
theoretical knowledge itself, but instead regulates and guides our thought 
and action towards an ideal limit.  
It is one of the most beautiful interpretations of the politically 
liberatory Spinoza, and one can agree with Ted Stolze that the Anglophone 
world has been so far cheated of Matheron’s remarkable scholarship, which 
still lacks systematic translation.43 Yet while effectively re-positioning 
collectivity as the focus of Spinoza’s liberatory project, Matheron’s 
journey towards this ideal limit is still unclear. In a recent insightful study, 
Gerald Gaus warns against any transcendental ideal of perfect justice. Too 
often, this subjective idealism leads to unviable and unenviable monolithic 
social structures which others will disagree with, and which encourage us 
to postpone challenging present, minor injustices for the ‘mere dreaming’ 
of distant utopias.44 Echoing Amartya Sen, a certain loose pluralism of 
ideas about justice is best for societal harmony, reflecting an inherently 
conflicting plurality of views. In the Phenomenology, Hegel presented a 
similar view in his critique of the ‘law of the heart’ in Rousseau, which 
believes that the world is inherently rational, once people listen to their 
hearts over repressive external authority.45 Such a projection of ideals 
inevitably results in disappointment, as the agent’s revolutionary idealism 
fails to find agreement with others, or its political programme viable, 
resulting in an inevitable negation of other individuals’ freedoms as crude 
 
42 Ibid., p. 612 n95. 
43 Ted Stolze, ‘Revisiting a Marxist encounter with Spinoza: Alexandre Matheron on 
Militant Reason and Intellectual Love of God’, Crisis and Critique, 2.1 (2015), p. 
153. 
44 Gerald Gaus, The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2016), p. 16. 
45 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Mil-
ler (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), §372. 
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self-interest is taken to be the secret truth of the world in the ‘frenzy of self-
conceit’.46 The individual’s liberation and ascension into a communism of 
minds may be possible for individuals or possibly even small groups, but 
what of the majority of humanity, rendered passive by poverty, ignorance 
and state violence?  
Here one of Matheron’s most attentive readers, Stolze, helps expand 
the account. If indignation against oppression is the ‘first affective moment 
of resistance’,47 it remains insufficiently destabilising of the state’s power 
and, as Bove indicates, merely renews its self-management. He then draws 
attention to a second affective moment of resistance, ‘glory’ which, like 
Bove’s account of benevolence, enables a passive multitude to act more 
powerfully by imagining another praising their actions, and so behaving in 
ways worthy of esteem.48 However this is also found to be unstable, as 
individuals experiencing glory do not necessarily produce socially useful 
actions. ‘Militants’ (or anyone involved in political struggle) must 
therefore strive towards a third affective moment of resistance, ‘fortitude’, 
and its accompanying active affects of courage and generosity.49 Courage 
and generosity are reciprocal, binding people together in mutually useful 
relationships while enabling them to overcome sad passive affects like fear. 
Stolze then outlines an affective therapy for militants using E5p10s, where 
Spinoza issues in mnemonic form his ethical rules for living by directing 
us to understand the causes of the affects. By understanding the causes of 
indignation and glory in political oppression and disempowerment, 
militants can thereby strengthen ‘the affect of generosity through reflection 
on the usefulness of social solidarity’.50  
Such an ethics of fortitude thereby serves two uses: it enables those 
 
46 Ibid., §379. 
47 Ted Stolze, ‘An Ethics for Marxism: Spinoza on Fortitude’, Rethinking Marxism, 
26.4 (2014), p. 567. 
48 Ibid., p. 569-71. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 574. 
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involved in a political struggle to recognise that there can be ‘no successful 
collective emancipation without the widespread participation of 
courageous and generous individuals’, and so by implication, that they 
should strive to enable as many as possible to become as courageous and 
generous as they can be.51 Secondly, it identifies the ‘internal struggle’ of 
ethical practice as essential alongside concrete political analysis – fortitude 
and ‘serenity of mind’ can preserve intact the militant and their politics in 
a desperate political conjuncture long after indignation, vainglory and other 
passive affects lead to group burnout. 
Both Matheron’s communism of minds and Stolze’s militant fortitude 
make great progress in transposing Spinoza’s ethics to political struggles, 
beyond those vague affirmations of joy and multitudinal power that have 
dogged leftist work in this area. Yet neither bridge the link between the 
individual’s affective empowerment and self-knowledge and that fostered 
with small sympathetic affinity groups, with the wider social movements 
that cause tyrants to fall and states to change their form. Matheron’s 
description of indignation supposes a kind of naturalistic probability that 
others will recognise each other’s suffering, but this doesn’t account for the 
prejudices and superstition to which humanity is naturally prone, according 
to the TTP, and which result in popular servitude and the passive tolerance 
of inequality. Nor does a difficult-to-attain collective fortitude explain how 
resistance begins in the first place, before it can be sustained. Two problems 
remain: how individuals are able (or enabled) to recognise their common 
grievance, a problem of ideology and hegemony; and how solidarity 
becomes sufficiently established such that the indignant can maintain their 
collective activity together (in contrast to merely cultivating a resilient 
fortitudo individually) against the violent forces of the tyrant. 
 
2. The Revolution will not be Transcendental 
The following section is dedicated to this problem, but there is a niggling 
tendency in Matheron and Stolze that is also found in other theorists of 
 
51 Ibid., pp. 576-77. 
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political resistance. This is the elevation of revolution to transcendence, 
such that communism or equivalent liberatory egalitarian politico-
economic forms become an ‘ideal’ or ‘regulative Idea’ that thought and 
action are directed towards without ever reaching. Jodi Dean presents 
communism as a ‘horizon’ that is ‘Real in the sense of impossible – we can 
never reach it’.52 For Bruno Bosteels, it is a politics ‘without actuality’, but 
one that conditions such an actuality, a reading he traces back to Sartre.53 
Alain Badiou similarly has presented communism as an idea possessing 
universal and emancipatory truth, one that is produced through events 
whose truth procedure consists in being founded on egalitarian axioms to 
which subjects must remain faithful.54 For Fredric Jameson, ‘collective 
desire’ is the material that supplies the ‘content of Utopian form’, if it is 
not to be found in the ‘half-forgotten trace of the experience of peasant 
solidarity and collectivity’.55 Even Álvaro García Linera, vice-president of 
Bolivia’s socialist government since 2006, describes communism both as 
‘the general horizon of the era’ and yet not an ‘immediate’ one,56 one whose 
promise is heralded, then postponed. Granted, Marx and Engels already 
spell out this problem in the German Ideology, which warns against setting 
up some ‘ideal’ or pragmatic ‘state of affairs’, in favour of a communism 
as ‘the real movement which abolishes the present state of things’.57 But 
something of the activity of the verb abolish is lost in this talk. It is 
reminiscent of Kafka’s parable ‘Before the law’, that such a political 
transformation is ‘possible… but not at the moment’.58 
 
52 Dean, Communist Horizon, p. 2.  
53 Bruno Bosteels, The Actuality of Communism (London: Verso, 2011), p. 228. 
54 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics, trans. by Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 52-
4. 
55 Frederic Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future (London: Verso, 2005), p. 85. 
56 Quoted in Bosteels, Actuality of Communism, pp. 226-27. 
57 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (New York: Prometheus, 
1998), p. 57 
58 Franz Kafka, ‘Before the Law’, in The Complete Short Stories, ed. by N.N. Glatzer, 
trans. by Willa and Edwin Muir (London: Vintage, 2005), p. 3. 
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While there is something pragmatic in conceding the present 
unlikelihood of international communism, Mark Fisher has rightly 
criticised the dangers of empty utopianism on the Left. Such positions are 
the ‘flipside of capitalist realism’ in accepting the impossibility of the 
‘realistic’ or ‘realisable’ demands of socialist visions.59 In place of ‘luxury 
communism’ – a concept initially developed in Judy Thorne’s work, and 
subsequently by Aaron Bastani and others at Novara Media – Fisher 
proposed a ‘communist realism’. It would be concerned with remoulding 
what he considered in his later, unfinished Acid Communism as an 
inherently ‘plastic’, mutable desire, one that sought to luxuriate in free time 
and fellowship, realised through collective joy and shared consciousness-
raising against the ‘mandatory individualism’ of contemporary 
capitalism.60 Utopian visions by contrast inadvertently reframe the realism 
of contemporary defeat, and prevent others from making something of their 
indignation. Raising revolution to such an ethereal plane devalues 
everyday struggles in the home or workplace, in actual or virtual public 
places, or at local or national government level. Here bonds of solidarity 
can be formed, sad passive affects checked and overcome with joyous ones, 
if not active ones, and individual and collective behaviours can be 
transformed at least in part so as to increase the intellectual and physical 
powers of others. These forms of individual and collective empowerment 
do matter and should not be discounted as mere lifestyle politics or 
reformism.  
To discount the importance of everyday ‘folk’ political struggles is to 
fall into the trap of what Wendy Brown calls ‘Left melancholia’,61 
abandoning the initial premises of actual collective empowerment and 
retreating into a rarefied ideal, possible sometime after the end of history. 
In Freud’s well-known account, melancholia is defined as the loss of a 
 
59 ‘Luxury Communism: A Conversation between Mark Fisher and Judy Thorne’ in 
Futures and Fictions, ed. by Henriette Gunkel, Ayesha Hameed and Simon O’Sulli-
van (London: Repeater, 2017), p. 160. 
60 Fisher, ‘Acid Communism’, pp. 757, 763. 
61 Wendy Brown, ‘Resisting Left Melancholia’, boundary 2, 26.3 (1999), pp. 19-27. 
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loved object, whose loss the individual mitigates by narcissistically 
identifying with its own ego and internalising it as its very subjectivity (or 
ethos). ‘In this way an object loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the 
conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the 
critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification’.62 Anger 
against the lost object is directed at the ego itself, leading to debilitating 
depression and inaction, interrupted by occasional bursts of splenetic re-
commitment to the loved object. The means of resolving the conflict would 
be to recognise and grieve the lost object, international socialism and its 
revolutionary realisation – or recognise that such an object is by no means 
lost at all, and that its possession is not subjective but intrinsically 
collective. 
Though Stolze goes some way to outline an individual ethics of 
fortitude, at best this only assists us in our singular ability to resist, rather 
than our collective capacity to revolt. It is apt that he draws on Simon 
Critchley in discussing anger as the ‘first political emotion’.63 Critchley’s 
ethics of political resistance is premised entirely on disappointment, that 
‘we inhabit a violently unjust world’ whose ‘hard reality’ must be faced.64 
Resistance therefore consists in the non-violent creation of an ‘interstitial 
distance from the state’ in which critique and the vague construction of new 
political subjectivities is undertaken, under the premise that the 
impoverished global proletariat is no longer a relevant historical actor.65 
What this ‘interstitial critique’ and ‘infinite demands on the state’ actually 
involve is not clear, but Critchley provides a firmer foundation for it in a 
separate discussion of Kierkegaard and religious faith, wherein it is ‘the 
faithless who can best sustain the rigor of faith without requiring security, 
 
62 Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, The Standard Edition of the Com-
plete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume XIV, ed. and trans. by J. Stra-
chey (London: Hogarth Press, 2001), p. 243.  
63 Stolze, ‘An Ethics for Marxism’, p. 567; Simon Critchley, Infinitely Demanding 
(London: Verso, 2008), p. 130. 
64 Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
65 Ibid., pp. 91, 124, 132. 
 
 DAN TAYLOR 39 
   
 
guarantees, and rewards’.66 Resistance becomes an ethical outlook 
premised on resignation, wherein revolution becomes the stuff of 
disappointed faith, a means of perseverance in an evil world.  
This premise also grounds Howard Caygill’s otherwise excellent 
study of political resistance, wherein ‘the capacity to resist’ is made 
‘distinct from the revolutionary project of realizing freedom’.67 Caygill 
distrusts its pragmatic ends-driven nature, preferring a disillusioned and 
vitalistic resistance of energeia that opposes all forms of domination.68 In 
its rarefied, politically detached form, resistance is a ‘vital capacity’ of life 
over death and an ‘empowering non-violent interruption of these routines 
of evil’.69 Resistance therefore becomes a question of the subject’s 
endurance in the world. Being ‘merely driven by matter’s aimless energy’ 
in an unruly world, such quietism might find more solace in the work of 
pessimistic philosopher and Thatcherite John Gray, abandoning the dream 
of collective struggle as the road to Stalinist serfdom, and retreating into 
the safe solipsism of ‘inner freedom’.70 Indeed, why maintain political 
beliefs at all, if individual freedom and life is all one can truly count on? 
Berlant helpfully defines as ‘cruel optimism’ those desires and attachments 
that actually impede one’s happiness and flourishing.71 Like her examples 
of binge eating, filial duty or participation in the broken forms of a sham 
representative democracy, might the project of collective power and 
revolution merely be a ‘fantasy’ and optimistic attachment that enables us 
to persist in a passive state under neoliberal capitalism?72 In this case, 
Caygill’s endorsement of disillusion need not be so disillusioning. 
For those brutalised by capitalism, bigotry, patriarchy, state violence 
 
66 Simon Critchley, The Faith of the Faithless (London: Verso, 2012), p. 252. 
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or racism, or determined to express solidarity with and defend those who 
are, one needs more than ethical persistence. There remains a need for a 
political theory that indicates how commonly-held grievances can be 
manifested in collective forms that become powerful and empowering, 
transforming repressive social institutions and retaking state power from 
the grip of these forces. There is however one means of overcoming these 
debilitating consequences, drawing a line out of the impasse of ethical 
resistance towards a thinking of collective power, one that faces the 
voluntary servitude that makes ‘some fight for their servitude as if for 
salvation’,73 and enables a becoming freer at the immanent level of desire 
and the imagination. 
 
3. Emulation 
There were two textual problems with Matheron’s account of indignation 
alluded to earlier. The first concerns fear. It is not strictly consistent with 
Spinoza to claim that the subject will react to the tyrant’s violence which 
causes her/him fear with anger and hatred. As Spinoza argues, it is fear of 
isolation that compels a subject to ally with others in a civil state, and a 
common fear shared that, like hope, enables a multitude to think as if by 
one mind.74 Fear, like hope, compels the subject to obey, or follow others 
who obey, and so is more likely to condition obedience. The second 
concerns the passive affects. Being not only a passive affect but also a sad 
affect, indignation can only cause harm to the subject who experiences it: 
E4p51 states that it is an ‘evil’ and a cause of further passivity, and 4p73 
finds no place for it in the life of the individual guided by reason. At the 
same time, 4p54 remarks that while the passive sad affects of ‘repentance’ 
and ‘humility’ are not virtues but failures to adequately grasp one’s power 
and desire, they serve a socially instrumental use. Given that in Spinoza’s 
 
73 TTP pref.10. For Deleuze and Guttari, this is the ‘fundamental problem of political 
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schema those who live according to the dictates of reason are very few 
indeed, ‘since men must sin, they ought rather to sin in that direction’.75 Of 
course, no-one willingly elects this affective pair. Instead it is through 
prophets who, having ‘considered the common advantage’, commend these 
affects, alongside hope and fear, because those who are ‘subject to these 
affects can be guided far more easily… [to] live from the guidance of 
reason’. 
Indignation is not one of these affects (nor is it, technically, one of the 
given imitative affects). While it may serve a politically instrumental use 
in establishing solidarity and energising a people to overthrow a tyrant and 
change the state’s form, there is nothing about it that will necessarily foster 
a sense of collectivity beyond the point of observing the injury to another 
we judge of like nature. It led to the ‘imprudence’ of the English republican 
regicides of the Civil War, whose replacement of one prince with another 
Spinoza had little time for. Once the injury ends, so does the indignation, 
and so the insurrectionaries return home, some possibly repentant. Instead, 
there is another affect of resistance that may animate the politics of 
collective desire, without the textual or political problems above, and that 
is emulation.  
Emulation is defined as ‘a desire for a thing which is generated in us 
because we imagine that others have the same desire’.76 It is also one of the 
imitative affects, but specifically imitates what is judged to be ‘honourable, 
useful or pleasant’. Emulation emerges from the primary affect of desire,77 
and so is neither joyous nor sad, but the only affect of desire that is also 
imitative. Imagining others sharing the same desire results in ‘undoing the 
divide between ego-centrism and altruism’ as Jason Read puts it, revealing 
the necessarily relational or, for him, transindividual nature of the affects.78 
At the same time, emulation is not intrinsically empowering – the desire 
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we imagine could be a harmful one, or we might seek to repress a given 
desire to conform with others with reactionary beliefs – but it redirects 
attention to the fundamental role of the imagination in forging lastingly 
powerful collectives. If we emulate what we judge to be of a common 
nature, then the question of any project of collective empowerment 
becomes how we are to extend our imagination of what is common with 
us, our commonality.  
Spinoza provides no ready answer here, though the proximate affects 
offer more illumination. If someone affects another judged like us with joy, 
we are affected with love towards them, that is, joy accompanied by the 
idea of an external cause.79 Inversely, if this same person affects another 
like us in a way that causes them suffering, we are affected with sadness 
for the victim, and hatred for this person.80 This sadness compels us to ‘free 
a thing we pity from its suffering’, resulting either in the destruction of this 
person, or another desire to do a good for the thing we pity, which Spinoza 
calls ‘benevolence’,81 one of Bove’s affects of resistance earlier. For 
Spinoza, our internal affective structure is most often defined by our 
relations to those around us. We strive to accomplish whatever we imagine 
others to look on with joy, which leads to ‘ambition’;82 and if we believe 
that our actions have caused others joy, we experience ‘self-esteem’.83 If 
we imagine others loving, desiring or hating the same object in the same 
way that we do, we experience our own affect with greater intensity and 
constancy,84 and by the same token, the greater the affect by which we 
imagine a thing we love to be affected toward us, the greater joy or self-
esteem we ourselves experience.85 
One can now identify some foundations for a project of collective 
 
79 E3p27c1; 3p13c. 
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empowerment through the affects: by emulation we desire a common good, 
because we imagine others like ourselves desiring it. In extending our 
concept of a common nature towards as many as we can, we feel love for 
those who bring joy to our friends, and in expressing this love, thereby 
increase our circle of friends. We care for and defend our friends who are 
injured, benevolently seeking to restore their power, and possibly 
revenging those who have injured them as our enemies. Our ambitious 
desire to accomplish things that cause others joy, that is, which empowers 
them, will also lead to a feeling of self-esteem when we recognise our 
worth in enabling others. And when we imagine our friends loving and 
desiring the same ideas and activities that we do, we love them with even 
greater constancy, renewing our commitment and solidarity in this 
collective flourishing.  
However, there is nothing yet to prevent emulation becoming envy,86 
ambition leading to mutual strife or possessive greed,87 and love or desire 
from being disappointed or spurned,88 returning us back to solipsism, 
isolation and merely ethical resistance. The politicisation of the imitative 
affects faces the problem of what Alex Williams calls ‘negative solidarity’ 
– a collective sense of indignation that reacts to say workers’ strikes, wage 
freezes, loss of social security or protected rights for refugees with a kind 
of disempowered, sad commonality: ‘because I must endure increasingly 
austere working conditions […] then everyone else must too’.89 Emulation 
can work both ways: one judged like us may get no sympathy whatsoever 
for their indignation and anger, because we ourselves have endured similar 
sad affects. Berlant would call it a form of ‘cruel optimism’ again: as we 
struggle to persist in individualised, meritocratic fantasies of the lucky, 
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rewarded life, so those that complain about a rigged game are subject to 
ridicule and resentment, and structural injustices little more than individual 
‘bad luck’ cases.90  
In her more sympathetic study of working class supporters of the 
American Right, Arlie Russell Hochschild draws our attention to the ‘deep 
story’ (or shared imaginary) of a collectively-weakened people. As social 
and economic conditions worsen for most, many see themselves as waiting 
in a long, slow-moving line. By working hard, paying taxes and not 
challenging the status quo, they expect to be duly rewarded by the 
American Dream, ‘the goal of everyone waiting in line’,91 but ahead, 
immigrants, ethnic minorities and benefits scroungers are presented (by a 
powerful right-wing media) as cutting the queue, sanctioned, if not 
encouraged, by the federal government. If ‘it’s people like you who have 
made this country great’,92 so the disenchanted collective imaginary goes, 
then at some point emulation requires others not being subject to sympathy 
and solidarity, but passive or outright hostility. It is akin to the previously 
discussed ‘frenzy of self-conceit’ in Hegel.  
Spinoza earlier praised prophets for deploying the sad affects of 
repentance and humility to make others live by the guidance of reason 
(following 4p54s), and so it is remarkable that he did not write of the joyous 
affects they are paired with also being deployed in pursuit of the same. 
Where repentance is first defined, it is merely the saddened obverse of 
‘self-esteem’, that is, ‘joy accompanied by the idea of an internal cause’.93 
Likewise, whereas humility is sadness ‘accompanied by the idea of our 
own weakness’,94 joy accompanied by our power of acting is ‘self-love’ or, 
again, ‘self-esteem’. Yet Spinoza then claims that our observation of 
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another’s power of acting inclines us to hate or envy them unless we judge 
them either as an equal or irredeemably superior to us.95 If we venerate 
another because of their prudence and strength of character, this is only 
because we cannot imagine their virtues to be of a nature common with 
ours, ‘any more than we envy trees their height, or lions their strength’.  
It is unfortunate that Spinoza does not consider his active affects of 
fortitude,96 courage and generosity as necessarily encouraging of others to 
emulate them. Had he done so, he might have presented an account of a 
collective figurehead like the prophet who does not merely mobilise 
through sad passive affects like fear, repentance and humility, but also 
through the affective powers of self-esteem, courage, generosity, fortitude, 
the cultural processes underlying commonality, and the passive affects of 
ambition, pity, love and emulation. Such a figure would thereby empower 
a community more than the prophet who merely mobilises through sadness. 
As Spinoza deduces, joy is stronger than sadness in that it involves passing 
to a state of greater power,97 while knowledge alone is insufficient to 
overcome the affects – only a stronger affect can overcome an existing 
one.98  
But could a singular individual fulfil the exacting standards of such a 
‘prophet’? Spinoza’s own hesitation about the contemporary use of true 
prophets and shared imaginaries reflects not only his context, but also a 
disdain for resting hopes on any human being. ‘I know that I am human, 
and I may have erred’, he repeats in the TTP.99 But what if this prophet 
were not one but many, a ‘singular plural’, as Del Lucchese puts it, after 
Jean-Luc Nancy?100 For the prophet is simply one with the capability of 
grasping reasonable ways of living, which they then relay to other 
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individuals through the persuasive means of the affects and imagination in 
a way the majority can understand.101 By implication, anyone capable of 
persuading others to live peacefully and cooperatively together through 
affective, symbolic or imaginary registers that they can not only grasp but 
come to incorporate as their own – thereby recognising their own common 
nature and refusing to tolerate external oppression – might be termed a 
prophet. The means of educating the desire of individuals to extend 
commonality, emulate what is best in others, act and think as a collective 
group with each other, and then act as if by one mind according to reason, 
falls not to one prophet, but a collective prophet. Such a prophet might be 
reconceived by a collective noun well-known, but worth exploring in a 
more disruptive, collectivising light – the People. 
 
4. Positive Depersonalisation 
It sometimes seems that a virtuous, quietist, often wholly ethical (and 
therefore individual) call for resistance is the order of the day. While many 
of us may talk hard about the problems of contemporary capitalism, it’s 
often alongside a more withdrawn and private amplification of one’s 
productivity at work. There is a common feeling of fear that all will be 
taken away if we do not work hard enough, thereby cutting down time to 
play, collaborate or conspire with others of a common nature, as the 
accumulation of private capital continues unimpeded.  
If previous collective forms can teach us anything, it is that their 
contagious motivation and joy only comes into being amid participating in 
their activity. There is no intrinsic guarantee that they will remain 
consistently egalitarian (that is, if they start so) or that they will succeed or 
fail in their avowed goals. But collective desire is immanent, never 
teleological. It acts out of solidarity with others, and is constituted by these 
first, real affective bonds – not transcendent and promethean ambitions of 
total class uniformity, of changing everything, forever. As Mark Fisher put 
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it, it is about ‘positive depersonalisation’,102 overcoming what Walter 
Benjamin saw as the ‘phantasmagoria’ of individualised outlooks.103 
Through sharing our feelings and experiences of contemporary capitalism 
together, we become more aware not just of ourselves and each other, but 
also that the solutions to our problems must lie beyond our individual 
selves. ‘No individuals can change anything, not even themselves’, Fisher 
wrote, ‘but collective activation is already, immanently, overcoming 
individualised immiseration’. 
It is a case of finding spaces of collective enjoyment, care and 
fellowship, ones which preserve not only our own mental and physical 
power but directly nourish others around us. Collective desire is all about 
‘making hope practical, rather than despair convincing’ as Raymond 
Williams memorably wrote, or, in Antonio Gramsci’s words, of a 
‘pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will’.104 Fellowship, friendship 
and love are the glue of common association, the feeling and result of being 
among those of a common nature. Such a ‘commons’ is not rooted in crude 
cultural norms of ‘nature’, be it race or gender, but in a shared imaginary 
and sense of what is common to all, a sense which by the guidance of 
reason becomes universal, tolerant, peaceable and egalitarian. Even in 
difficult times, the care, fellowship, solidarity and open thinking that we 
share together is of critical importance, even if it is insufficient to 
overthrow oppressive forces in itself. This sense collectively empowers 
and helps transform affects of anger and indignation into ones of joy, 
emulation and lasting hope.  
Hence, in an ethics for militants, these affirmative values are essential, 
and should be actively cultivated, protected and valued over points of 
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doctrinal conformity. ‘To do all we can do’, as Deleuze polemically draws 
out as Spinoza’s prime ethical instruction, is always already a collective 
activity.105 This collective desire for freedom, this ‘communism of minds’, 
can intersect with the desires of an individual. Fortitude, friendship, 
courage, solidarity and love are the means by which both the individual 
and collective stay alive, resist and revolt against the saddened passive 
affects and isolation of the contemporary conjuncture. 
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